The other sides the extremist groups and the far-right such as The Base, the Boogaloo Bois, and the Atomwaffen Division have also upgraded their capability. Both of them as militant existence have made deradicalization efforts –as the tools to cultivate moderate thinking especially to youth people– has been facing though challenges.

The recent portrait of global terror groups have increased capability to launch deadly attacks, to recruit and to regroup from the wreak-havoc terrorist organization.

The upgrading of global terror capability are inspiring homegrown violent extremists, taking and implementing franchise model, promoting “salad bar” ideology, keeping ideologies motivating violence.

The other terror groups values have been maintaining by many factors such as fueled by a lack of political and economic progress, structural inequalities, and continuing sectarianism.

However, al Qaeda and Islamic State, as well as their affiliates, and the ideology of Salafi-jihadism itself, are still capable of inspiring homegrown violent extremists in the West.

After twenty years of the U.S.’s Global War on Terror, the leadership and upper echelon of al-Qaeda and IS have been successively winnowed down. In an effort to adapt, these organizations have shifted to an affiliate or franchise model, where regional branches pursue a blend of local and global objectives.

Yet more comprehensively, the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland is remarkably more diverse than at any point over the previous two decades. It now includes not only Salafi-jihadists but also violent far-right extremists, conspiracy theorists, and a host of anti-government agitators and domestic terrorists.

Atomwaffen Division

The threat from the far-right emanates from organizations and groups, including The Base and the Atomwaffen Division (also known as National Socialist Order), on the one hand, and the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters, on the other.

These organizations are representative of the threat posed by groups organic to the United States. There is also a far-right ecosystem, fueled by virulent racist propaganda, conspiracies, and disinformation, that inspire lone actor attacks, like those in El Paso; Pittsburgh PA; and Buffalo NY, to name just a few. The Capitol Insurrection of January 6, 2021, is further emblematic of the threat.

What was mostly a monochromatic threat from Salafi-jihadist groups and those individuals they sought to inspire, has become a kaleidoscope with new threats from white supremacists and neo-Nazis, shadowy anarchist elements, neo-Luddites, and the extreme fringe of violent incels—politicized involuntary celibates fueled by misogyny.

Popular theories like accelerationism, whose proponents believe in the complete destruction of current systems of government, appeal to individuals that claim allegiance to movements on both the far-left and the far-right.

Newer extremist groups, including the Boogaloo Bois, are a byproduct of this trend, as it remains difficult to place them squarely on the ideological spectrum. The COVID-19 pandemic has also broadened the tent, drawing in anti-vaxxers and those opposed to government measures to stem the spread of the coronavirus.

FBI Director Christopher Wray has also warned about a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “salad bar” ideology because it provides extremists with options similar to a buffet. This means extremists are borrowing from numerous, and at times seemingly contradictory, ideological foundations.

Whatever one labels the phenomenon, what it tells us is that today’s extremists are more comfortable ‘mixing and matching’ distinct strands of broader ideologies. What used to be a fairly consistent and homogenous threat from Sunni jihadists, has given way to a variegated attack matrix, the most defining feature of which is the broad range of ideologies motivating violence.

Franchising Strategy

Al-Qaeda, for its part, has faced two decades of relentless and aggressive U.S.-led counterterrorism operations, including drone strikes and special operations forces raids against its leadership.

To survive, the group adopted a franchising strategy, which led it to expand worldwide, establishing regional branches and affiliates in the Levant, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent, and beyond.

While he was criticized widely for lacking charisma and failing to inspire the next generation of would-be jihadists, Zawahiri should be credited for keeping the majority of al-Qaeda’s franchises intact and loyal to al-Qaeda central, and retaining a sense of continuity from the perceived victories of the Afghan jihad which gave al-Qaeda its pedigree.

Without his leadership, the organization may have become overshadowed by its offshoots like Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), which pursue more localized agendas. Although some have suggested that al-Shabaab is moving in the opposite direction, increasingly looking to expand its operations outside of Somalia, Zawahiri’s death could impact the trajectory of al-Qaeda franchise groups as affiliates and branches reevaluate their respective strategies to focus more directly on their “near enemies.”

Both al-Qaeda and IS have focused resources on strengthening their affiliates throughout Africa and exploit ongoing conflicts or governance deficits to garner local and regional support.

The center of gravity for the global jihadist movement was initially in South Asia, where al-Qaeda core was able to set roots thanks to sympathetic regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

After the rise of IS, the main theatre of the jihadist movement shifted to the Middle East. But in mid-2022, there is a strong argument to be made that sub Saharan Africa has become the epicenter of jihad.

Agitate for More Autonomy

Despite the best efforts of multiple U.N. stabilization missions (though none have had explicit counterterrorism mandates or resources), and fragmented counterterrorism efforts from a range of international actors, terrorist attacks against government and civilian targets have increased in both frequency and sophistication.

IS propaganda now routinely highlights successful operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and the Sahel.

With the core leadership of both al-Qaeda and IS at a nadir, jihadist groups throughout Africa could agitate for more autonomy. Competing priorities, limited resources, and fresh opportunities could transform the jihadist landscape throughout Africa. Hyper localized and regional agendas, however, will not necessarily continue in perpetuity.

History has shown that group objectives can evolve over time. For example, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria sought to overthrow the Algerian government, but this did not preclude the group from targeting French interests and citizens, including kidnappings, bombings, and attempted hijackings.

As French and German forces reconsider their troop commitments in the Sahel, and as Russia and Russian backed private military contractors like the Wagner Group expand their roles, the security environment in the region will remain in flux.

The French withdrawal from Mali, which was finalized earlier this week, may create an opportunity for jihadist groups to use the country as a safe haven if Malian forces and their Russian security partners fail to secure the country’s rural areas.

If a jihadist group can carve out territory that can be used as a launchpad for regional or transnational terrorism, pressure on Western governments to bolster ongoing counterterrorism operations in the region will mount.

This possibility likely impacts the decision making of groups like JNIM and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). At the same time, failure to address the structural conditions which generate support for violent groups could render counterterrorism measures ineffective in the long term.

The Impacts and Benefits

Moreover, as lines between designated terrorist organizations and other nonstate armed groups blur, questions must be raised about the impacts and benefits of imposing international and U.N. sanctions and embargoes on al-Qaeda and ISIL affiliates due to their association with a transnational terrorist group.

More than two decades after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the creation of a complex international framework of institutions and laws to respond to an emergent transnational threat, the policy focus on counterterrorism has been subsumed by conventional conflicts, climate and a number of crises, including the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions and food insecurity.

While some governments have portrayed these as mutually exclusive priorities, they have underestimated the extent to which there has been overlap between terrorism and geopolitics.

At the same time, the diminished attention to counterterrorism can be seen as one measure of success in eliminating a transnational threat; it remains important however to invest in prevention and mitigation strategies.

Jihadist ideology of the kind propagated by al-Qaeda continues to resonate with many communities globally, fueled by a lack of political and economic progress, structural inequalities, and continuing sectarianism.

Furthermore, new technologies offer jihadists additional advantages, including a greater ability to communicate undetected through end-to-end encryption, while sophisticated propaganda successfully radicalizes violent extremists in the West.

Zawahiri has left his imprint on global jihad, but the future of this movement could look far different as a result of the decentralization that began under his leadership.

This evolution may leave fragile states unprepared to deal with the security challenges posed by increasingly capable regional or local jihadist groups, who will likely benefit from the U.S. and its allies’ preoccupation with the rise of China and a revanchist Russia.

Sobering Picture

A recently released report from the United Nations ISIL/Daesh Monitoring Team presents a sobering picture of the threat landscape noting the challenges posed by an increase in jihadist activity in sub-Saharan Africa, and lingering concerns about Afghanistan following the Taliban’s takeover, as well as the unresolved issue of ISIL-affiliated individuals and children in camps in northeast Syria.

The danger posed by the global jihadist movement in mid-2022 looks much different than it did just a few years ago. Islamic State’s territorial ‘caliphate’ has been destroyed, but the group remains active in Iraq and Syria, even in a diminished state.

Its leaders have repeatedly been found hiding in northwestern Syria, while in the northeast, prison breaks are a frequent reminder of the organization’s durability. Al-Qaeda once again enjoys safe haven in Afghanistan, operating with more freedom of maneuver since the Taliban seized control of the country nearly one year ago following the U.S. withdrawal.

The UN report also detailed al-Qaeda’s current line of succession, a fascinating piece of information for counterterrorism analysts, especially considering the age and health of al-Zawahiri and how much the future of al-Qaeda will depend on his successor.

The report lists Sayf al-Adl, Abdal Rahman al-Maghrebi, Yazid Mebrak (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and Ahmed Diriye (al Shabaab).

Because al-Adl is believed to be living under semi-house arrest in Iran, and considering the vulnerability of al-Qaeda leaders in that country (Abu Muhammad al Masri was allegedly killed by Israeli commandos in August 2020 in Tehran), al-Adl might not be the most viable option.

Complex Operations

Al-Maghrebi, the son-in-law of al-Zawahiri and an established al-Qaeda veteran, may be a more feasible option. Interestingly, the report mentions Diriye in the line of succession, but no leaders from al-Qaeda’s Yemeni franchise, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which it represents as demoted from first-tier status.

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic State affiliates have maintained a high operational tempo, with attacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Mozambique, Chad, and elsewhere.

In West Africa, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) recently engineered a major prison break in Abuja, Nigeria, demonstrating an ability to execute complex operations in the previously secure capital.

Elsewhere, the organization has separated larger affiliates into smaller ones, likely in an effort to streamline command-and-control and provide a boost to propaganda and information operations.

Islamic State is limited in Somalia and Libya, and is competing for primacy in parts of the Sahel with al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), which has expanded its operational reach beyond Mali and into Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, and Benin.

Russian influence through the private military company Wagner Group continues to destabilize parts of West Africa, through the use of heavy-handed tactics and disinformation campaigns. This heavy-handed approach may prove to be counterproductive and inadvertently benefit jihadist groups in the long term.***